Heidegger's digestion of the existentialists squeezed them into some fairly accessible forms under inaccessible language. You might know the German 'Dasein' as the type of being that we are; beings that are alongside, that in maintaining themselves, engage with the world on their terms. I think (though no one serious will probably agree, so don't crib this for an essay) that all living things can satisfy a minimal description of Dasein. A bacteria has thrown-ness, presses into possibilities, has ontological guilt (a finite genome that may be maladapted to the environment), being-toward-death in pursuing more life, more DNA, reproduction. The DNA & protein technology of a bacterium is like the layer upon layer of practices, on top of layer upon layer of organic processes that define the kind of being that we are, which Heidegger calls Dasein. Dasein is famously 'always-already in a world', and slightly less famously, 'We are our world, existingly.'
Where Hegel talks about the self separating from world in a negation, Heidegger saw the affirmative property 'mineness.' Both are intended (I think) as referring to ongoing maintenance of a distinction, that engender further distinctions in the subject as the world is apprehended in an endless process of learning, of becoming familiar. (It seems possible that Heidegger thought Hegel had dealt with this and so didn't spend much time talking about learning? He discusses breakdown cases, and finding the property of heaviness from the fact that the hammer is too heavy for a particular task, which is, I guess his version of the dialectical progression and arises from his emphasis on 'being' as the big invisible thing we're all doing in our way, rather than changing our being, becoming.)
"We are our world, existingly" is emphasising that the "ways" we make our selves of are all apprehensions of the beings (things, tools, beings, other people) that are our world. ('World' in Heidegger is really not far from the conventional usage - X's world is one of personal drama, or gardening. World is not the absolute world, but a human's map of the world, a 'worldonculous', we might say.)
I think the modern "large models" approach that astonishes* us with apparent understanding of text meanings (Google) or generative models like DALL-E are (mini) attuned worldonculi; they are an articulation (jointing) of the background. (I say 'mini' because they are trained (so far as I have seen) on data sets and the data sets are of similar type - video streams, audio streams, text from documents, or spanning two types - labelling text and imagery. This limitation is probably useful (for safety? certainly for learning how things work), but a concept 'tree' that is constructed from images or text, or spanning both, is very lightweight. As you climb a tree, you get measures of strength, stiffness, roughness, yield, and once those dimensions appear you consider them for other trees etc.)
But, suppose we have a very large model, trained with an enormous quantity of data of great dimensionality, that 'handles' things in the world including 'behaviours' - what would it lack with respect to being the kind of being that we are? We have computational apprehension of a world, but something is needed that 'has' that world, 'existingly.'
I would put a lot into "existingly": the kinds of grounding practices that make life possible and that enable new life, more life over the very long term are part of it in what we know of ourselves. Indigenous knowledge in very old continuous cultures is of that sort, and the 'radical freedom' of existentialism is not really known to it - human flourishing in a place is good, but has to be bound by the nature of the place. There is a religious duty to not eat female turtles, for example, or not to take all the eggs from under a sitting mother bird. The duty is a duty of essence - it defines the type of being in the land that the land allows but only humans with that in their makeup at the level of religious commitment will e.g. die obeying it.
Non-indigenous people may learn our living in much less grounded ways (and it is unstable - that our children's children might still be able to live exactly as we do is not something we aspire to), but the essence-binding religious natures we may adopt are more explicit and so more accessible. It is in the way dasein exists that it may take a stand with regard to itself - it has a world, and a knowledge of what within that world is 'mine' and it takes the risk of committing its existence to ungrounded knowledge. Some themes recur - a dimension of moral life - that there is better and worse behaviour, better and worse personality, that judgment is needed but that good judgment is very merciful, that the self is fertile ground for mistakes, and so on. None of these can be developed except as an engagement with others, through time. But this is where ability to train on a world full of racism and sexism but exclude them from yourself begins.
So, the question of how to take a worldonculus and make it conscious remains very hard, and involves a lot of things that would not be more accessible in symbolic computation (that I know of) than they are in sub-symbolic. I am inclined to think, with Robert Brandom, that the normative rules of what counts as knowledge and rationale can ultimately be mapped to some modal-logical description of the world as it is, up to a point. The harder cases are how normative rules about other people and clashing understandings of the world are resolved. Humans are hard at work negotiating this all day every day from birth and we (I won't speak for all humans, but even just me and my friends) already accept a very diverse slate of strategies, from parenting to bossing to voting to trading - there are many accepted templates, and (you will notice) acceptance of many of them is also actively being contested (both theoretically by thinkers and practically by doers).
What do I think they should do? Maybe explicit moral instruction would get somewhere - labeled speech roles; understand this is a bad person, this is hostility - now how would you do hostility to a bad person? I don't know if a self-presentation is intrinsically necessary, or if communication and negotiation with an Other (or two or three) similar will spontaneously lead to it developing.
(I just had to get this off my chest)
*There are plenty of critics of the achievements of these models as, for all the gargantuan computational engineering they require, are too 'lite' for use in the real world - the regular fatalities in 'self-driving' cars and the ongoing
