Morality and Science - a union in Math?

Sam Harris is a neroscientist who believes that an accurate understanding of how the brain works and what it wants will sufficiently inform us to allow a morality to be derived.  A lot of philosophy has revolved around this question, and has pretty uniformly concluded that what is and what ought are in different games entirely, and the whole point of the ought is to describe what, in fact, isn't.


Doing a thought experiment of my own, what kind of scientific knowledge could be sufficiently 'grounded' that it was adequate for us. Morality is proper to the kind of beings that we are - not for dogs, not rocks, not ideas. If it could be shown that conscious minds in community had greater or lesser fulfillment of a single value (say existence) in proportion to their adherence to certain rules, then we would have a morality for reasoning beings grounded only in their existence. If you exist, you are subject to the basis rule.  If you want to give up the basis rule, you give up existence.  


My suggestion, borrowing from Heidegger's 'care'* as the basic structure the kind of being that we are, would be to say that something like 'love' holds the straying parts of a person together with their reality, and can hold together a super-personal reality of a community. So I imagine Sam Harris could be right as far as that. AI math could demonstrate some realities for thinking beings, some constraints on them and their behaviour, which we would need to interpret for eating, coupling, breathing and pooping beings.

To get through rationality to a value on existence though, I think you have to go to a Hajime Tanabe or similar (about whom more when I finish his book).


*Heidegger would not be terribly happy seeing 'care' alongside love.  Care in his scheme is just a kind of recognised and dealt-with ness, a functional acknowledgement and inclusion, and to him is worlds away from Love.  To me though, this is minimal love - to include, to reconcile.  But there's a world of difference between me and him, which leaves this idea as philosotainment (as Scott Adams terms it).