I think there must be more to it than this - there must be an ethicisation of the practical. Abraham is right not simply because he obeys God, but because who he obeys happens to be the God of Love, who will always provide himself a lamb. A sincerely mistaken Abraham would be a wrongdoer, if I am right. Jephthah the judge is probably a good example.
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
Right and Right
Kierkegaard sets existential commitment over moral generality with his famous (infamous) principle of the teleological suspension of the ethical - the ends justifying an unjust act. In Fear and Trembling, the unjust act is the sacrifice of Isaac on Mt Moria. Abraham is right to lie to his boy and his servants in the interest of getting there and doing the dreadful deed of loyalty to God, because it is to God.
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Woohoo! The second-best bits of Kierkegaard!
ReplyDeleteI think Kierkegaard would argue back at you on a couple of points.
God is the absolute authority, regardless of whether God is love. Kierkegaard proposes Abraham's actions as the structure of a faithful act. Faith is obedience in the face of (Hegelian) ethics for the sake of personal telos. Bear in mind that the ends are the meeting of that telos, not necessarily anything lesser. Therefore, the person of faith should obey God because God's authority is supreme. I think that Kierkegaard regards it as a question of authority.
Abraham had no idea that God would substitute a lamb for Isaac. The little retellings at the start of F&T seem to be there to remind us that every step of Abraham's journey was a decision to obey the call to kill Isaac. Abraham committed to it, without knowing the punchline. Unfortunately, we read the story already knowing the ending so we miss the three days of Abraham's anguished travel. Faith is that anguished travel.
So if we take Kierkegaard's view on faith like this, then Hebrews 11 comes to life in the same way (esp vs. 39). Faith is the obedience to the divine authority and it requires existential commitment. The resigned thing might be returned, but there's no guarantee of that - and it's certainly impossible without the movements of faith.
From Kierkegaard - "to be able to fall down in such a way that the same second it looks as if one were standing and walking, to transform the leap of life into a walk, absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian–that only the knight of faith can do–and this is the one and only prodigy."
ReplyDeleteFrom my father- 'I feel it may be a bit harsh to say Abraham lied to Isaac about the lamb. He seems to me to have said (unwittingly?) a rather profound prophecy, in which he was careful with the truth to the point where Isaac was lulled into some security. Wouldn't it be good to know what, if anything, was said between them when it came time to tie him on the altar? ESV and NASB rightly say "God will provide for himself," rather than the NIV's "God himself will provide". I think that fits in with our view of how justification works very well.
The ram, (quite specifically not a lamb), is at best a partial fulfilment of Abraham's prophecy, but sufficient to exonerate him, I think.'
On balance, I need to look at more Kierkegaard. I now think the sweats and trembling are for the ethical man in that predicament, while the knight of faith, even as he says 'the boy and I will return to you' already receives him back - (I think thats a paraphrase but I need to re-read). This is a bit different from the position in my original post.
My point is just that it also matters who this faith is put in if you are going to be a knight of faith and stand even though you fall. Kierkegaard soft-pedaled this because it was the great sin (in his eyes) of the Danish church that it thought being correct about God must equal being right with God. But both are needed.
(I also think God's existence (his authority) and his essence (his love) are inextricable. Without love, he would disintegrate himself into a scattering infinity of selves, which would themselves then disintegrate)